alternative farm programs that would transfer $1, $2, or $3 billion per year (over and above the 1996 farm bill) to program crop producers (FAPRI-UMC Report 07-00). The farm program tools of interest were: a supplemental income protection program, higher marketing loan rates, and additional AMTA payments.
The analysis of these options showed that even with $3 billion per year of payments it would not be sufficient to reduce the cash flow problem facing farmers (Smith and Richardson) .
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the impacts of alternative farm program tools that could be used to transfer $6 billion per year of additional payments to program crop and oilseed producers. The program tools used for the analysis are: a supplemental income protection (SIP) program, increased marketing loan rates (ML), and increased AMTA payments (AMTA). It is assumed that Congress would set the payments and loan rates so that additional spending above the baseline would average $6 billion per The remainder of the paper is organized in three parts. The first part summarizes the four policy scenarios and presents the sector level analysis of the baseline and the three alternative options. The second part presents the farm level impacts and the rankings of the policy options for farmers in the South.
The final section discusses the prospects for agriculture and the agricultural policy debate in 2001.
Summary of Policy Assumptions
As previously mentioned, this paper analyzes the impacts of three alternative policy options that are The SIP option differs from the BASE option only through the introduction of the SIP program. All baseline policies remain in place. The first step in determining payments under SIP is to calculate the value of production for each crop. The value of production is determined by simply multiplying national production by the higher of the loan rate or the season-average farm price. Second, the value of production is then calculated on a per-acre basis by dividing by U.S. harvested acres. Third, the trigger level, or target value, that serves as a basis for determining payments is calculated as a percentage of the average per-acre value of production for the 1995-99 period. In this analysis, the trigger value necessary to achieve the desired increase in spending is 103.35 percent of the 1995-99 average. The final step calculates the SIP payment as the difference between the current-year value of production and the trigger level, assuming that this value is greater than zero. It is important to note that the program is based on national production and prices. If a payment is made in a given year, each producer of a particular crop will get the same peracre payment. For example, a corn producer in Alabama will receive the same per-acre payment as a corn producer in Iowa. Also, a producer in Alabama could lose a crop, but should the U.S. Value of Production not fall low enough, the Alabama producer would not receive a payment under this program.
The ML option increases marketing loan rates above Baseline levels for the 2001-05 crops. The Baseline plays a key role in evaluating the impacts of this alternative. In the FAPRI Baseline, loan rates for each crop are held constant at 2000 levels through 2001, but thereafter are allowed to adjust based on formulas in the FAIR Act. This results in lower rates for the 2002 crop when compared to 2001, thus allowing for larger percentage increases in scenario loan rates than would have been the case had Baseline loan rates been held fixed at 2001 levels. In addition, the relationship between projected prices and loan rates has a significant impact on the importance of a loan rate increase. Given the Baseline, soybeans and cotton will on average realize a much larger benefit from higher loan rates than corn and wheat. A critical assumption of the ML option is that loan rates for all crops are increased by the same percentage above Baseline levels. In this analysis, an increase of 17.5 percent above Baseline levels is required to reach the spending target.
The third and final option, AMTA, effectively represents a continuation of what has been done in each of the past three years through the various supplemental assistance packages. In the analysis, annual payments of $6 billion are distributed in the same fashion as the funds included in the supplemental packages. As in the past, funds are also included for oilseeds. Feed grains receive approximately 50 percent of additional funds while wheat collects 24 percent of the additional spending. Payments to oilseeds account for 8 percent of the total.
Sector Level Impacts of Policy Options
Tables 1-3 present the sector level results of each of the policy options. In each case, the mean and standard deviation are based on 500 stochastic iterations through the FAPRI modeling system. The simulations incorporate variability for major exogenous factors such as weather and macroeconomic variables. A detailed discussion of the stochastic methodology can be found in FAPRI-UMC Report #07-00.
Impacts at the sector level begin with adjustments in planted acreage in response to the different signals of the alternative policy options. Under the SIP and ML options, the benefits of each program are crop-specific and vary directly with the number of acres or bushels produced. As a result, the two options will have a direct impact on both total area as well as the crop mix. Under the AMTA option, payments are theoretically decoupled from the production decision. Any contract holder currently receiving payments under the FAIR Act need not plant a crop to receive those payments or any additional AMTA payments. It is commonly accepted that the payments definitely have an impact on land values and cash rents. However, it is less clear what the actual impacts are on aggregate acreage and crop mix. For this analysis, we have not included any acreage impacts under the AMTA option. We do not conclude that the additional AMTA payments would have no effect on acreage decisions, but we are not able to estimate specific impacts with confidence.
Under the SIP and ML options, the shifts in acreage are rather modest, with most changes being less than 1 million acres. For the 2001-05 period, acreage under SIP increases above BASE levels for each of the five major crops as producers respond to the additional support provided by the program. The most significant increase occurs in cotton with planted area averaging one million acres above the BASE option.
For each of the other crops, acreage increases by approximately 200 thousand acres. The acreage shifts under the loan option are mixed due to the differences in relative benefits associated with an increase in loan rates. For commodities that are "deep in the money" with Baseline loan rates, such as soybeans and cotton, increased loan rates generate a substantial benefit relative to corn and wheat. Not surprisingly, soybean acreage increases by 1.5 million acres above the Baseline, while cotton gains 840 thousand acres.
Many of those acres come from feed grains and wheat, with corn and wheat losing 300 thousand and 1.2 million acres, respectively. The additional support of the SIP and ML options reduces the standard deviation of planted area relative to the BASE option.
The price changes in the analysis reflect the production changes brought about by the acreage shifts.
As mentioned earlier, the changes are relatively modest with mean corn, soybean and wheat prices moving by less than 2 percent. Changes are a bit more substantial for cotton and rice with declines under SIP of approximately 8 percent from Baseline levels.
After incorporating the payments under the three policy options, per-acre returns (Table 2) In general, the reduction in variability can be attributed to the additional downside protection offered by the SIP option. Table 3 presents the impacts of the policy options on net CCC outlays and U.S. net farm income. By design, each policy option increases net CCC outlays by an annual average of $6 billion above Baseline levels for the 2001-05 crops. Due to the timing of crop and fiscal years, the total additional costs of $30 billion are spread over fiscal years 2001-06. U.S. net farm income increases above the BASE option, but by less than the amount of additional spending. In all cases, a portion of the additional government payments is captured by higher land values and cash rents. The AMTA option results in a total increase of $26.7 billion over calendar [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] , the largest impact of the three alternatives. The SIP and ML options increase farm income by $21.4 billion and $23.0 billion, respectively. The differences between these options and the AMTA option can be attributed to the impacts on overall acreage and production.
Since payments under the SIP and ML alternatives directly depend on either the number of acres harvested or the number of bushels produced, it is reasonable to expect that those programs will have an impact on overall acreage levels. With an inelastic demand for the major crops, an increase in overall production levels causes a proportionately larger decline in price. As a result, overall market net income to the crops sector falls. Although a portion of this decline is captured in lower feed costs to the livestock sector, the total impact is negative on net farm income. The sum effect is that $1 spent under each of these programs gives slightly less of a bump to net farm income than $1 spent in direct decoupled payments.
Farm Level Impacts of Policy Options
The probability distributions of prices, marketing loan rates, AMTA payment rates, and SIP payments from the sector analysis were used directly as input in FLIPSIM to quantify the impacts of the four policy options on the cash flows for a dozen representative crop farms in the South.
1 Four feed grain/oilseed farms, four cotton farms and three rice farms from the AFPC representative farm database were used for the analysis. Most of these representative farms were developed in 1989-1990 and have been updated every three years since. The farms are classified as large commercial family farms and generally are larger than the typical full-time family farms in their region. With the help of a local extension specialist in each area, panels of producers were interviewed to obtain production, cost, and balance sheet data to describe the farms. To validate the model, the farm panels were asked to review the simulated results for their farm data and revisions were made until the results matched their recent experiences.
Characteristics of the farms in 2000 are summarized in Appendix Table A Additionally, the stochastic national crop yields associated with the sector analysis were used in FLIPSIM to correlate local yields to national crop yields. 2 Local yields were correlated to national yields to appropriately simulate SIP payments that are triggered by decreases in national revenues.
The results of simulating the representative crop farms for the four policy options are summarized in Improvements in the cash flow situation for the representative farms are largely due to $6 billion of increased program payments to the sector changing the probability distributions for net cash farm income.
Increased government payments raise the mean for net cash farm income, and in most all cases, reduce the relative risk for net income.
Rankings of the policy options for the representative crop farms, based on the mean and relative risk for net cash farm income, are summarized in Table 5 . Increasing the marketing loan rate is preferred by two farms (MOCG and TNG) because of the high portion of receipts coming from soybeans. Higher AMTA payment rates are ranked first for three of the farms (TXNP, TXR and ARR) due largely to the low yield risk on these irrigated farms. The SIP program received six first place rankings because of two factors: (a) it provides support to farms with risky yields, and (b) it tends to pay more frequently to highly diversified farms, such as, the SCG farm. Ranking the policy options based on reduction in relative risk for net cash farm income results in the SIP option maintaining its first place ranking on 6 of the 11 farms (Table 5 ).
The rankings of the four farm program options changes only slightly if they are ranked based on the probability of a cash flow deficit in 2005. The only change is for the SCG farm to rank higher AMTA payments over the SIP program (Table 5) . However, the change in rankings is not robust given it is based on a one percentage point change in the probabilities (Table 4) . Certainty equivalents (CE) between the first place program option and the remaining options can be used to quantify the net benefits a producer would have to forego if they did not get the first place option.
The CEs for the policy options are summarized in Table 6 . 6 The TXNP grain farm prefers a higher AMTA program and if forced to accept a SIP program instead would suffer an $116,000 decrease in NPV over the five year planning horizon (Table 6 ). The CE also shows that a higher AMTA would increase NPV for the TXNP farm by $360,000 over the current farm program in the BASE.
Among the feed grain farms, the CE values for the second place policy options are quite small, ranging from 3 to 7 percent of annual cash receipts (Table 6 and Appendix Table A ). This result suggests that their preference for the first place policy option may not be very strong. In contrast, the CE values for the four cotton farms are 11 to 17 percent of their annual cash receipts so they may have strong preferences for a SIP program. The three rice farms are divided in their preferences with the TXR farm having a strong preference against the SIP program ($240,000 or 10 percent of receipts) and the ARR farm having a weak preference ($63,000 or 7 percent of receipts) against a SIP.
The CE values associated with the Baseline are relatively large, as a percent of cash receipts, for all 11 farms (Table 6 ). The CE for the Baseline ranges from 17 to 60 percent of annual cash receipts suggesting that large commercial farms have a lot to be gained from a change in policy. Even if a farm does not get its first choice, the benefits can be substantial for even its second or third choice. For instance, the CE between the ARR farms fourth (Baseline) and third choice (ML) is about $204,000 over the 2001-2005 period.
Summary
At the sector level, the impacts on overall supply, demand and price are relatively modest. Acreage shifts due to the policy options are generally less than two million acres, and subsequently, price changes are relatively modest. The most noticeable impacts occur in the SIP option for cotton and rice.
For individual commodities, the question as to which policy ranks 'best' is related to their expected price levels compared to the loan rate, the proportion of historical AMTA payments the commodity has received, or the base period used to calculate the SIP support level. Cotton returns, on a per-acre basis, rise most under the SIP option, due mainly to the size of the payments in the first three years of the program. Of the three, the ML option gives soybean producers the greatest increase in returns.
Given the market price projections for soybeans throughout the analysis period, the increase in loan rates positions the soybean sector so that it would receive loan deficiency payments in nearly all years of the analysis. Conversely, under the AMTA option, payments go to soybean producers based on the historical proportion of payments received under the earlier supplemental packages. Thus, while the feed grains sector receives 50 percent of the payments, oilseed producers receive only eight percent. Corn, wheat and rice see the largest gains in average per-acre returns under the AMTA option. Rice currently receives 8 percent of the AMTA funds, but accounts for only one percent of the area planted to the 15 major crops.
The farm level analysis suggests that any of the three policy options considered here would greatly benefit crop producers in the South. Higher marketing loan rates, higher AMTA payment rates or a SIP program would significantly increase net cash farm incomes for large commercial farms. Additionally, these program options would substantially reduce risk associated with net farm income, relative to continuation of the 1996 farm program.
Rankings of the Baseline and the three program alternatives do not show a clear winner across feed grain, cotton and rice farms in the South. One consensus appears to be that cotton farmers would prefer the SIP program as defined and analyzed in this paper. Two of the three rice farms also ranked the SIP program over the other programs. Feed grain farms that receive a large portion of their receipts from oilseeds tend to prefer higher marketing loan rates because of the LDP benefits to soybeans. Only three of the 11 representative crop farms preferred the higher AMTA payment rate option. For these three farms the SIP program was ranked second. Overall, the SIP program was ranked first or second by 10 of the 11 representative crop farms.
In conclusion, we should note that the results of the analysis are not "universal." They are conditioned on the construction of the particular alternatives as well as the projections in the FAPRI Baseline. In addition, the analysis does not serve as an endorsement for any particular policy option, but rather an objective assessment of the impacts of the alternatives. The options analyzed in this study reflect only a small sample of the alternatives that have emerged in the early stages of the farm bill debate. It is expected that as the debate intensifies, new alternatives will surface and the demand for objective analysis will increase. FAPRI and AFPC will continue to refine the stochastic methodology in this report and apply it in future policy analysis.
1 FLIPSIM is a Monte Carlo, whole farm simulation model capable of simulating farms under alternative farm programs. The model is described in detail by Richardson and Nixon. 2 Crop yields are simulated multivariate empirical in FLIPSIM using the procedure described by Richardson, Klose and Gray. The procedure was expanded to correlate local crop yields to national crop yields so that the relationship observed over the past 10 years would be repeated over the five year planning horizon. 2 The first value is the preference ranking for a policy option assuming the decision maker is risk averse. The value in parenthesis is the certainty equivalents in thousands of dollars that the decision maker would be willing to pay in order to gain access to the preferred policy option. 
